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Introduction
In recent years there has been growing awareness of the importance of self-employmeni for growth and employment creation. Governments around the world are increasingly itnplementing policies designed to promote self-employment (see. e.g., OECD 1998). Yet relatively little is known about the determinants of self-employment, especially the effects on the self-employment rate of govemment policy instruments. As we show in this article, self-employment rates in the OECD display marked variations across countries, both in cross-section "snapshots"" and over time. The objeclive of this article is to explain these disparate patterns by identifying the determinants of selfemployment rates, placing special emphasis on govemment tax and transfer policies.
Previous studies of the detenninants of national self-employment rates have been confined to a handful of countries.' Although they have been able to .shed some light on the causes of selfemployment rates within particular countries, they suffer from two drawbacks. First, they cannot explain the pronounced observed differences in self-employment rates between countries. Second, national time-series studies tend to work with only short spans of data, consigning tests of statistical signilicance to lack of power, and hence reliability.
Both of these problems can be addressed by exploiting the panel nature of available OECD data.
(a) 'Risers* 1972 'Risers* 1973 'Risers* 1974 'Risers* 1975 'Risers* 1976 'Risers* 1977 'Risers* 1978 'Risers* 1979 'Risers* 1980 'Risers* 1981 'Risers* 1982 'Risers* 1983 'Risers* 1984 'Risers* 1985 'Risers* 1986 'Risers* 1989 'Risers* 1990 'Risers* 1991 'Risers* 1992 'Risers* 1993 'Risers* 1994 'Risers* 1995 'Risers* 1996 ) 'Fallers' 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1901 1962 1983 1984 1985 1966 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Figure 1. Rate of Nonagricultural Self-Employment in OECD Countries. 1972 Countries. -1996 , Source: Authors' calculations based on data in OECD Lubour Force Statistics.
(c) ' Statics' 1972 Statics' 1973 Statics' 1974 Statics' 1975 Statics' 1978 Statics' 1977 Statics' 1978 Statics' 1979 Statics' 1980 Statics' 1981 Statics' 1982 Statics' 1983 Statics' 1984 Statics' 1985 Statics' 1986 Statics' 19S7 1968 Statics' 1989 Statics' 1990 Statics' 1991 Statics' 1992 Statics' 1993 Statics' 1994 Statics' 1995 Statics' 1996 Figure 1. Continued Panel data enjoys the advantage over static cross-sections or s ingle-counlry time-series data of looking at more than just one time period and country. Trends in setf-eniployment rates and cross-country differences in these rates are both of interest in their own right. This motivated the influential article of Acs. Audretsch. and Evans (1994; henceforth AAE) , as well as Staber and Bogenhold (1993) . Robson and Wren (1999) , Blanchflower (2000) , and OECD (2000) . These articles all used ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate self employment regressions based on pooled cross-section time-series or fixed/ random effects specifications. Yet recent developments in the analysis of panel data regression models cast doubt on the validity of the findings from these studies. Although it has long been recognized that OLS yields biased and inconsistent estimates in dynamic panel data regression analysis (see Nickell 19S1) . recent work has shown that OLS will also produce biased and inconsistent estimates even in regular panel data models when-as is shown to be the case here-variables possess unit roots." In addition, conventional significance tests based on OLS estimates cannot be used to reliably identify genuine relationships between variables. This problem is well known in the traditional time-series econometrics literature (e.g.. Phillips 1986) , where it prompted the development of cointegration estimators (Engle and Granger 1987; Johansen i 988) . Only recently have these econometric techniques been extended to the panel framework. A key advantage of these techniques is that by utilizing crosscountry information, panel unit root and cointegration tests are much more powerful than for the conventional single-country case, making inference more reliable. This point is especially important in view of the low power of conventional unit root and cointegration tests (Banerjee et al. 1993 ).
• See Pesaran and Smith |1995l, Kao (I W9). Harris and Tzavalis (1999) , and Pedroni {!949b) for formal demonstralionsof Ihis poini. Moreover, incorporating deiemiinisiic time diimmies in the panel regressions cannot circumvent ihe inconsistency of OLS. The practical importance of using ii panel daia coiniegralion eslimalor in the context of international self-emp!o>nienl rates is illustrated by a recent study by the OECD (2000) . When several pooled self-emp)oyment regressions were estimated by OLS. virtually no explanatory variable was found to be significant, despite strong evidence to the contrary from national studies. But panel data cointegration lecbniques conducted for ihe OECD by one of the authors (S.C.P.) revealed that there were, in fact, signilicant relationships between the variables (see OECD 2000) .
In this article we investigate the determinants of self-employment using a panel of annual data on 12 OECD countries spanning the period 1972-1996. We use a wider range oi explanatory variables than previous studies, paying particular attention to variables under the direct control of governments: average rates of personal income tax, employers' social security contributions, and benefit replacement rates. We tind that the emphasis on macroeconomic and demographic variables in previous studies appears to have been misplaced. Macroeconomic variables arc found to be neither significant nor robust determinants of self-employment rates in the OECD. Instead, government policy variables appear to play a central role.
In particular, we show that self-employment rates are positively and significantly related to average income tax rates and negatively and significantly related to the benefit replacement rate. We also show that p;mel OLS would have failed to uncover these results.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the variation in national selfemployment rates in the panel, describes the data, and presents several hypotheses that may explain these patterns. Section 3 briefiy describes the panel unit root and cointegration techniques and presents the results. Section 4 concludes the article.
Data and Possible Explanations
Annual data for the rate of nonagricultural self-employment in 12 OECD countries over the period 1972-1996 are plotted in Figure I using various issues of OECD Labor Force Statistics. The numerator is the number of employers and own account workers in nonagricultura! civilian employment. wherea.s the denominator includes all persons in civilian employment in the nonagricultural sector plus the numbers in unemployment. The agricultural sector is excluded, as self-employment rates in this sector are likely to be heavily influenced by historically and culturally determined traditions of family ownership and factors other than those that influence self-employment rates in the rest of the economy.
The graphs show considerable dispersion in the rate of nonagricultural self-employment in the OECD, ranging from a low of just over 4% lor much of the period in Sweden, to an average of around 19% in Italy. There appear to be three distinct groupings of countries. One group, graphed in of Figure  2 , experienced a trend increase in the rate of self-employment over the period {Australia. Canada, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). A second group ( Figure Ib ) experienced a declining rate of self-employment (France, Japan, Norway), and in the third group (Figure lc) , the rate of self-employment remained fairly static (Italy, Spain, and the United States). The sharpest increases occurred in Sweden and the United Kingdom, whereas the steepest declines in the selfemployment rate were experienced in Japan and France.
This picture of rather disparate trends and patterns in OECD self-employment echoes that found by AAE in their study for the period and in the more recent study by Blanchflower (2000) ."'^ What kind of factors can we identify to try to explain the cross-national variations in self-employment Ihat we observe? A number of potential explanatory variables are suggested by ihc " Our dufiniiLon of self-employment excludes unpaid family workers. These comprise a reUitivdy high proportion of selfemployment in agriculture (Blanchflower 2t)0()). but are much less commonly observed outside the agricultural sector. The study by Blanchflower (2(KX1| shows the imponance of ihe inclusion, or otherwise, of the agricultural sector to the idcntilicution of trends in the rate of self-employment. When the agricultunil sector is included, the trend in the rate of selfemploymont in OECD countries over the period iy6fi-\99b is ulmost unit'urmly negative, with only the Uniled Kingdom. Portugal, and New Zealand (ihe lalter two are not included in our data set) experiencing any increase. The itnplication is that within the OECD countries, the rate of self-employment has been falling most substantially in the agricultural sector. As indicated above, Ihe reasons for this decline are likely to be peculiar to this sector and lie outside the scope of the present study. '' 1997. previous literature on this issue. For example, the findings of AAE suggested that the self-employment rate is related to the level of real per capita GDP, the demographic composition of the labor force, and the sectoral composition of GDP. Higher per capita GDP might be related negatively to aggregate self employment rates if it is associated with greater capital per worker, and hence greater average firm size (Lucas 1978) . On the other hand, higher per capita GDP might indicate buoyant demand conditions within countries, which might disproportionately benefit the self-employed. It is therefore not possible to unambiguously sign the effect of per capita GDP on self-employment rates a priori-AAE reported a negative relationship between the self-employment rate and the rate of female labor-force participation. This is consistent with the evidence that self-employment rates tend to be lower among women than men (see Table 1 ).^ We would expect a similar relationship to apply in our data. AAE also reported a positive relationship between the self-employment rate and the service sector share of GDP. This may be explained by technological factors that give the self-employed a comparative advantage in the service sector. This is evident from the figures presented in Table 2 , which show self-employment rates by sector for selected countries in our data sample. Thus, we predict a positive effect from the service sector share of GDP on self-employment rates.
A number of studies suggest that the rate of self-employment may be related to the rate of unemployment. Two contrasting effects may be at work in this relationship. On the one hand, individuals may be pushed into self-employment by a shortage of opportunities for paid work ("recession push""). In this ca.se, we would expect to see a positive relationship between the rate of unemployment and the rate of self-employment. On the other hand, a high rate of unemployment may be associated with relatively low levels of demand for the output of the self-employed ("prosperity pull'"), so that a negative relationship may be observed between these two variables. Individuals may '' Some studies have shown significant differences between men and women in the efFect of personal characteristics on ihe likelihood of self-employ men! (e.g., Fvans and Leightoti 19X9; Burke. Fitzroy. and Nolan 2(K)2). However, the limited evidence that exists suggests ihat. for the United States at leasi. the effects of macroeconomic factors on male and letnale selfemployment are broadly similar (Evans and Leighton 1989) . Hence, it seems reasonable to aggregate over the two gender groups for Ihe purposes of our analysis. also feel more comfortable taking on the risk.s associated with self-employment against the backdrop of a buoyant labor market that offers them the chance of a reasonably quick return to paid employment in the event of business failure. This again would lead us to expect to see a negative relationship between unemployment and self-employment.
Evidence from cross-country studies on this issue is mixed. Staher and Bogenhold (1993) find a positive relationship between the unemployment rate and the rate of self-employment in 17 OECD countries. Blanchflower (2(KK)). however, reports a negative relationship for most of the countries in his data sample. AAE report a positive relationship between the rate of unemployment and the rate of self-employment in a bivariate context, but this disappears when additional regressors are introduced into the equation. Yet it could be argued that if the researcher controls for levels of demand (and thereby the prosperity pull effect), then only the positive recession push effect will be identified. Since we control for aggregate income in all of our estimations, we tentatively predict a positive effect from unemployment rates on self-employment rates.
As well as using the variables outlined above, we also consider the effect on cross-national variations in self-employment of three tax and benefit variables. These are income tax and employees' social security contributions as a percentage of personal income (the average rate of income tax); employers" contributions to social security as a percentage of wages and salaries (the rate of payroll tax); and an OECD summary measure of the ratio of unemployment benefits to earnings (the replacement rate).
The possible effects of income tax rates on participation in self-employment have been well documented in the literature: see. for example. Blau (1987); Parker (1996 Parker ( , 1999 Parker ( . 2001 Parker ( . 2003 ; Robson and Wren (1999) ; Bruce (2000) ; and Scheutze (2000) . High rates of income tax may in principle have both positive and negative effects on the incentive for self-employment. The greater opportunities that are generally available to self-employed workers (relative to wage and salary workers) both for tax deduction of work-related expenses and for income tax evasion tend to favor a positive relationship between tax rates and self-employment. However, the tendency for high tax rates to diminish the incentive to supply effort may reduce the incentive for self-employment. In general, most of the empirical literature tends to find that the former effect dominates the latter, implying that higher tax rates are generally found to lead to an increase in self-employment. Part ot" the reason for the dominance of positive effects might be that marginal income tax rates are the same or very similar for employees and the self-employed in most countries (Price Waterhouse 2002). Therefore, labor supply effects of changing tax rates are similar in both occupations.' in contrast to tax avoidance effects that predominantly alTect the self-employed. Hence, we tentatively predict a positive effect from income tax rates on self-employment rates.
In contrast to the effects of income tax. the effects ot" payroll taxes on the rate of selfemployment have been less frequently studied. A high rate of payroll tax might induce employers to utilize self-employed contractors as a means of reducing the cost of labor, thus leading to a positive relationship between the payroll tax rate and the rate of self-employment. On the other hand, an increase in the rate of payroll tax may serve to reduce the incentive for self-employment among those who anticipate the need to hire other workers in order to run their business. Empirical evidence on this issue is limited. Using microdata on individuals in the United States, Moore (1983) hnds a positive effect of payroll tax rates on the probability of self-employment. OECD (1992) reports a correlation coefficient of -1-0.7 between the rate of employers' social security contributions and the rate of self-employment in a cross-section of 19 OECD countries. Given the theoretical arguments discussed above, there are reasons to believe that the effects of payroll taxes may differ between the self-employed who employ others (owner-managers) and independent sole traders. Unfortunately. sufficient data that would enable us to test this proposition are not available.
The replacement rate is a potentially important variable as a high level of unemployment benefits might discourage unemployed workers from setting up in business for themselves. Moreover, as selfemployed workers often do not enjoy the same benefit entitlements as those in waged employment, a high replacement rate could also discourage some workers from leaving paid-employment for selfemployment for fear of losing their access to benefits. Staber and Bogenhold (1993) report a negative relationship between unemployment benefits and the self-employment rate in their analysis of OECD selfemployment rates. We also predict a negative effect from replacement rates on self-employment rates.
Data on the level of per capita GDP {Y). the female labor force participation rate (/•'), the service sector share of GDP (I). the unemployment rate (f/), the average income and payroll tax rates {A and P). and the replacement rate {R) were compiled from a variety of OECD publications. The Appendix provides detailed information on data definitions and sources. Means and standard deviations of the explanatory variables, along with those for the rate of nonagricultural self-employment, are displayed in Table 3 . Unfortunately, as is apparent from Table 3 . we were unable to obtain consistent time-series data on all of the explanatory variables for all of the countries in our sample. Consequently, in our econometric analysis we estimated a model using data over 1972-1993 for five countries: Finland, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This contains examples from all three groups of countries illustrated in Figure I .
The salient features of the explanatory variables may be briefly described. Table 3 shows quite wide variation in the mean values of per capita GDP and rates of unemployment acros.s the countries in our sample. Rates of female labor force patticipation also show quite wide disparities, being particularly low in Ireland. Italy, and Spain, and relatively high in Sweden. There is somewhat less variation across countries in the service sector share of GDP, which ranges from 55% in Japan to just under 67% in the United Stales. The average rate of income tax stands out as particularly high in Sweden (54.3%) and Finland (42.7%). For the rate of payroll lax, the countries may be divided neatly into those with low rates of tax (the United States. Japan, and the United Kingdom) and those with much higher rates (Finland, France, Italy, and Sweden). Finally, the five countries for which we have consistent time series data on the replacement rate may again be divided into those with relatively low S = nonagricultural self-cmploymeni rate (%); Y = real per capita GDP (in thousands of IQS.'i U.S. dollars); U = unemploynicni rate (%): F = female labor-force participation rate [%): V -value added in services as a percentage of GDP; A = average rate of tax: P = payroll tax rale (%): R = replacement raic (OECD summary measure, "/t). See the Appendix tor precise definitions of the variables and data sources. Descriplivc statistics are sample means, wiib standard deviations in parenlbeses. Gaps indicate where daia are unavailable on a consistent basis over tbe entire sample period. Tbis is 1972-1*^% for all variables except R. for which it is 1472-149.^. The panel unil rool statistics i^i and II/HM ^e described in tbe text. They are both distributed as standard nomial variatcs under the null bypotbesis of no panel unil root. Tbcy are calculated for tbe natural logarithm of each variable and iire u.sed for one-tail lests, with rejection of ibc null being in tbe left-hand tail.
rates (the United States and Japan) and those with somewhat more generous unemployment benefits (Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).
Panel Unit Roots and Cointegration: Tests and Results
This section asks whether a long-ain equilibrium relationship exists between self-employment rates and the proposed explanatory variables. This requires the use of panel data integration and cointegration tests. Because these are relatively new developments in the econometric literature, we briefly describe them below.
Henceforth, we use the following notation: let / = 1, ... , N index the different countries in the panel, and let r= 1, .... 7 index time. Let .v,, denote country ("s (log) self-employment rate at time /. There are M explanatory variables (in logs) indexed by /= I. ... , M, and denoted by lyy,.
Uni! Root Tests
In order to investigate the possibility of panel cointegration, it is first necessary to determine whether self-employment rates and the explanatory variables evolve as unit root processes.
Among the best-known panel unit root tests are those of Im. Pesaran. and Shin (1997;  
for each eountry /, where t.,i is a eountry-specific intercept, and ,?,, are the number of lagged dependent variables required to rid the disturbances \y,, of serial correlation. The null hypothesis is that {v,} has a unit root: that is, 4>y, = 0 for all /. The alternative is that {yj} is trend stationary for at least some of the countries; that is, 4),, < 0 for some i.Î PS proposed two tesl statistics: the t-bar and LM-bar statistic. The t-bar statistic is constructed as follows: Denote the t-ratio of ^j, from Equation 1 by tjjji^j,). Then the t-bar statistic is the average of these t-ratios aeross the countries; 1 Î PS proved that the following standardized t-bar statistic converges to a standard normal variate: where p{,t,',. T) and a^{^y,-. T) are constants tabulated in Table 2 where yiigj^. T) and cr^C^y,, T) are eonstants tabulated in Table 1 of IPS. As with the standardized t-bar statistic, rejection of the null is in the left-hand tail of the standard normal distribution.
As IPS point out, this is a more genenil ultemalive hypolhesi.s than constraining all (j>,,. for /= I (V, to be less than zero, as studied by Levin and Lin (1993) . Il is noleworthy in this respect that Karlsson and Loihgren (2000) The bottom panel of Table 3 presents the standardized t-bar and LM-bar panel unit rool siatistics for each variable described in Section 2. There are only 25 time series observations per country, so the power of these tests is limited, despite gaining power relative to single country tests by pooling data across the panel.^ It is notable that the null hypothesis of a panel unit root cannot be rejected for any variable. This implies that previous studies based on least squares estimation may be vulnerable to the spurious regression problem and motivates the use of panel data cointegration methods. We proceed cautiously on this basis, in view of the limited sample sizes available.
Panel Cointegration Tests
Consider the following regression:
si, = ct; + 6/ + PI ..vi,, + p,,.A-2,-, + ... + p^,.rM,, + ey, for ; = 1
T. i=\ N.
The otj parameters are country-specific intercepts, or fixed effects, and the 5jf terms allow for countryspecific time trends. It should be noted that the slope coefficients |3|,, p2, p^, are permitted to vary across individual countries in the panel. All variables in Equation 2 are assumed to be unit root processes. Pedroni (1999a) has proposed two types of panel cointegration statistics designed to test the null hypothesis of no cointegration between the variables in Equation 2 against the alternative hypothesis of cointegration. Let y, denote the autoregressive coefficient of the estimated residuals for country ;, / -1 N. The null hypothesis for both types of statistic is the same; that is, H^y y/ -1 V/. The altemative hypothesis for the first type of statistic is//|:y, = Y < 1 V/. The altemative hypothesis for the second type of statistic is less restrictive, being H\: y, < 1 V/. Because the latter allows an additional source of heterogeneity across individual countries in the panel, this type is the most general, for which results are reported below.'" We focus on two panel cointegration statistics of the second type proposed by Pedroni (1999b) . The first is analogous to the Phillips and Perron (1988) /-statistic, and the second is analogous to the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) ^-statistic. Both statistics incorporate corrections for heteroscedasticity between countries and autocorrelation within countries, allowing the long-run covariance matrix to vary across the panel:
where ?/, are the residuals estimated from Equation 2, Xj is a set of estimated nuisance parameters derived from the long-run covariance matrix, and GJ is the corrected variance of the autoregression residuals. The p* are autocorrelation-corrected residuals, and i,* are their variances (sec Pedroni 1999b for details). Pedroni (1999b) shows that following an appropriate standardization, these statistics are ** An advantage of tbe IPS test i . *^ thai it allows lag length:* lo vary across countries within each test. We dii not reporl tbe lag lengths for each country and eacb variable Rir brevity. We also suppress the results obtained using an altemative panel unil root lesi suggested by Maddala and Wu (1999) , for wbicb simiiar results were obtained. All of ihese results are available frotn the auibors on request.
'" An altemative panel coimegraiion test has been proposed by Larsson, Lyhagen. and t^thgren (ly^S) . This is based on an exiension to tbe panel context of Johansen's (1988) tnultivariare likelihood-ba.sed approach. However, as noted by Bancrjee (1999) , the status of this test is unclear since the distribution of their cointegraticm siatisiic is only asserted, ralher than proven, to have the standard normal distribution.
asymptotically distributed as standard normal variales. We denote the standardized statistics by PP-t and ADF-t. respectively. Both diverge to negative infinity under the alternative hypothesis of panel cointegration. For the live countries for which data on every explanatory variable described in Section 2 was available, the PP-i statistic took the value -1.33 (/? = 0.09), whereas the ADF-t statistic took the value 6.63 {p < 0.01). The latter indicates strong evidence of cointegration, unlike the former. But in view of Monte Carlo studies that have shown the superiority of ADF-based unit root tests over alternatives (including PP; see Banerjee et al, 1993) , we interpret this as providing support for the notion of cointegration between self-employment rates and the hypothesized variables.
Results of Estimating the Cointegration Vectors
We estimate here the cointegrating relationship between self-employment rates and the explanatory variables. We do this by pooling the long-run information in the panel while allowing the short-run dynamics and lixed effects to be heterogeneous among the different members of the panel. We seek the pooled long-run estimates of the beta coefficients linking self-employment rates to the explanatory variables.
It is now well known that OLS is a biased and inconsistent estimator when applied to cointegrated panels (see footnote 2 for references). To illustrate how serious this bias can be, column 1 of Table 4 presents OLS fixed-effects estimates for each of the five models." The R' was 0.94. which exceeded the Durbin-Watson autocorrelation statistic of 0.81, This is a well-known indicator of spurious regression. Indeed, as shown by Pedroni {1999b), not only are the OLS coefficients biased when variables are nonstationary. so are their distributions, ruling out valid inferences based on their computed /-statistics.
To tackle this problem, Pedroni (1999b) proposed a fully modified OLS estimator (FMOLS) that provides consistent estimates of the beta coefficients, together with "V-ratios" that are asymptotically distributed as standard normal variates.'^ As with the panel cointegration test statistics, a correction for cross-panel heleroscedastieity and autocorrelation is applied to Ihe estimator.
Column 2 of Table 4 presents estimates of the cointegration vectors and t-ratios for the model. The results are broadly consistent with our priors. Higher average tax rates and lower female participation rates and replacement rates are significantly associated with higher self-employment rates in the panel, as predicted. The effects from value added in services and payroll taxes are positive and negative, respectively, but neither influence is statistically significant. Neither of the other two macroeconomic variables used in previous work (the unemployment rate and per capita GDP) is statistically significant.
Given the relatively restricted sample of observations available for estimation of our most complete model specification, we should be careful of reading too much into these results.'•* Nonetheless, the results contain several implications for current and future work on the determinants Wt arc grateful !o un annnymous referee imd Andrew OswLtld for suggesting ihe inclusiDn of year dummies, as well js Lounir^-speeific fixed effecls dummies, in ihese regressions. Rtsuhs were obtained using Version 4.3 of Ihe Time Series Prtxiessor ITSP). '" Year dummies are R-dundanl in this model, and therefore were extluded. Pedroni 1199'?hl proposed Iwii lypes of ^i^latislic to le.sl the null hypothesis of a single paranieier restriction. The most general type is termed "group mean fully modllied statistics": these are reported in columns 2, 3. and 4 of Tabie 4. Pedroni shows that significance tests based on these statistics are powertul and well-sized for T > N. which is the case here.
There is no reason lo suspect that the particular selection of cotintries available for the estimation of model 5 has any significant bearing on the results. As the discussion in section 2 demonstrates, these countries represent a balanced sample in lemis of the values bolh of the dependent variable and the explanatory variables in the model. Dependent variable is .S\ the pooled log sel ('-employment rate. Absolute (statistics are in parentheses. FMOLS I is the basic specification; FMOLS II augments it wiih a squared unetiiploymenl rate temi. and FMOLS ltl augments il with an unemployment-replacement rate interaction. All three of these models are estimated by fully modilied ordinary least squares (FMOLSl. See the lext for details. * Denotes statistical significance with a type I error of 10%, ** of 5*^, and *** of 1%.
of self-employment both within and across countries. First, notice that by comparing the results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 , conventional panel data OLS e.stimation would have tailed to obtain these results. Second, taxes and benefits (and also the female labor-force participation rate), rather than the macroeconomic variables of per capita GDP, unemployment, or aggregate industrial structure, appear to be the salient influences on self-employment rates in the OECD countries under study. This is of interest for two reasons. First, previous empirical work has emphasized macroeconomic factors, rather than tax and benefit variables. Our findings suggest that it might be necessary to reconsider the econometric specifications used in future research. Second, because tax and benefit variables are under direct government control, governments may have considerable influence on the extent of selfemployment within their economies. Although the promotion of self employment is unlikely to be a primary objective of government tax and benefit policies, governments should be aware of the implications for self-employment of their policy decisions in this area.
The results can also shed light on specific cross-country differences. For example, Sweden and Finland are countries with some of the lowest self-employment rates. Yet these countries are also among the highest for female participation and benefit replacement rates. The opposite is the case for Japan and the United Kingdom, which have lower female participation and benefit replacement rates. The United States is in an intermediate position, with average tax rates and labor force participation rates. That the differences between average self-employment rates in Japan and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and Finland and Sweden on the other, are not greater seems to be chiefly attributable to offsetting effects from average tax rates. These are predicted to bolster self-employment rates most in Finland and Sweden and least in Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Regarding trends, the greatest increases in self-employment rates were observed in the United Kingdom and Sweden. Both countries witnessed especially pronounced reductions in replacement rates over the sample period. In contrast, both beneht replacement rates and female labor-force participation rate.s increased in Japan. This can partly explain the downv^-ard self-employment trend in Japan, In contrast, changes in explanatory variables appeared to offset each other in the United State.s. where little selfemployment trend was observed.
Finally, we explored whether we can explain the mixed empirical results in the literature relating to the effect of unemployment on self-employment rates. To shed light on this issue, we included a quadratic unemployment rate variable in the specification. Tbe reason is that at high rates of unemployment, there are numerous workers available to start new businesses. The opposite is the case in economies with lower unemployment rates. However, economies witb very low unemployment rates might enjoy this position partly because tbeir citizens have (unobserved) probusiness attitudes that translate into a strong predisposition for both work and entrepreneurship. Then one might expect to see a U-shaped relationship between self-employment and unemployment rates. This is precisely what we find in column 3 of Table 4 . Japan has the lowest and tbe United Kingdom has the highest unemployment rates in our sample; they also have the highest self-employment rates. The other three countries all have lower unemployment and lower self-employment rates.
We also tried interactions between unemployment rates and some other variables. In principle, we might expect the push effect of unemployment on self-employment to be stronger in countries with relatively low benefit replacement rates. There would be greater incentives in such countries to exit unemployment for self-employment for any given level of aggregate demand. We tested this possibility by including as an additional explanatory variable an interaction between replacement and unemployment rates. The results appear in column 4 of Table 4 . Quite apart from the statistical insignificance of the interaction term, they do not support the notion that different replacement rates in different countries explain different effects of unemployment on self-employment. The coefhcients take the opposite signs (-1.49 and H-0.43) to those expected under the hypothesis. Finally, we tried including an interaction of unemployment with GDP per capita, the idea being that unemployment might have a greater positive effect on self employment in countries with bigh per capita demand (GDP). However, the results were similarly unsupportive, and for the sake of brevity are not reported here.' "*
Conclusion
This article has buill on previous studies of the determinants of self-employment by using a wider range of variables and by applying recently developed panel cointegration techniques to a panel of OECD countries. Special emphasis was placed on the possible role of government policy instruments in affecting the self-employment rate. Unlike single-country studies, a panel approach allows comparisons between countries at similar points in time as well as within countries over time. Panel data also increases the power of cointegration tests. We first documented the considerable variety in self-employment rates and trends within major OECD economies between 1972 and 1996. We then presented evidence that a set of explanatory variables cointegrates with self-employment ' •* Another possibility is that govemment regulations und liquidity con.striiints (e.g., Blaiichllower and Oswald I99S) also discourage unemployed people from switching inio self-employment. The unavailabiliiy of such variables in our sampling frame means that our results should probably be treated with cauiion. But ihis should noi deter future researchers from seeking ways of refining the analysis, possibly by using more detailed national data sels.
rates in a panel of five countries before showing that several maeroceonomie variables proposed in previous studies do not appear to explain robustly the evolution of international self-employment rates. Rather, tax-benetit variables and the female labor-force participation rate are found to possess most of the explanatory power. Of particular interest is the finding that self-employment rates are positively and significantly related to average income tax rates, and negatively and significantly related to the benefit replacement rate. These findings suggest a stronger influence of government policy decisions in the determination of cross-national variations in self-employment rates than has typically been recognized in the literature to date. Although subject to certain limitations acknowledged in the text, our findings appear robust to different model specifications. We also showed that conventional panel data OLS estimation would have failed to identify these results.
